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The hedging behaviour of Czech exporting firms is analysed using questionnaire 
information and interviews with banks. Approximately 60% of the 184 firms surveyed 
hedge their FX exposures, and about 88% of their exports are hedged. Most exporters use 
natural hedging, i.e. they balance incoming and outgoing payments in foreign currency as 
well as foreign currency assets and liabilities. Hedgers on financial markets prefer 
forwards and zero-cost option structures, as they are reluctant to pay option premiums. 
The typical maturity of financial instruments is three months to one year. More than one 
half of exporters hedge consistently, while around 60% hedge actively, taking advantage 
of currency moves. Our simple model of hedging behaviour for example suggests that 
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Due to substantial exchange rate movements and gradual appreciation of the Czech koruna, local 
exporters often hedge against exchange rate risk. This paper is focused on the hedging behaviour 
of Czech exporting firms. New information on hedging was gathered from two sources – a 
questionnaire for firms and interviews with banks. The results from these two sources provide a 
unique knowledge of what types of exporters hedge their foreign exchange exposures and how, 
what the intensity of foreign exchange hedging is in relation to export volume, and how successful 
these hedging activities are. On top of that, changes in firms’ hedging behaviour in response to the 
financial crisis are analysed. 
The initial sample contained 2,330 firms exporting at least 50% of their total earnings or having 
exports of at least one billion Czech koruna (CZK). Finally, out of the 2,330 questionnaires sent to 
firms we received 184 answers, which were further surveyed. 
The sample results show that the majority of exports (more than 90%) head to Europe and 75% of 
exports are paid for in EUR. The share of local currency is small at around 5%. Approximately 
60% of the firms surveyed hedge their FX exposures, and about 88% of their exports are hedged. 
Most exporters use natural hedging, i.e. they balance incoming and outgoing payments in foreign 
currency as well as foreign currency assets and liabilities. Hedgers on financial markets prefer 
forwards and zero-cost option structures, as they are reluctant to pay option premiums. More than 
one half of exporters hedge consistently, while around 60% hedge actively, taking advantage of 
currency moves. 
Our simple model of hedging behaviour suggests that firm size and export-to-sales ratio increase 
the probability of hedging on financial markets, while trading within a group, being owned by a 
foreign owner or being hedged naturally reduces the need for financial hedging.  
The sample of 184 exporting firms represents roughly 12% of local exports. However, caution is 
needed when interpreting the results. The sample includes only firms with a more than 50% share 
of exports in total sales or firms with nominal exports higher than CZK 1 billion. As the incentive 
to hedge decreases with firm size and export intensity ratio, the nationwide proportion of hedged 
exports is likely to be smaller than the one in our sample.                          




This paper analyses the hedging behaviour of exporting firms in the Czech Republic. From the central 
bank’s point of view, information about the responsiveness of firms’ production, exports and profits to 
exchange rate changes is essential for monetary policy decisions. To some extent, a knowledge of the 
determinants and results of firms’ hedging decisions is also relevant to the financial stability area and 
to banking supervision. Finally, potentially lower production due to exchange rate volatility is one of 
the topics in the discussion about euro adoption. 
Our study sets out primarily to analyse and ascertain what types of exporters hedge their foreign 
exchange exposures and how, what the intensity of foreign exchange hedging is in relation to export 
volume, and how successful these firms’ activities are, i.e. what the final impact of hedging is on 
firms’ profits. Within this framework we distinguish a wide range of hedging methods and identify the 
distribution of the time horizons used for hedging. Furthermore, we analyse firms’ hedging behaviour 
in the period 2005–2009 in the markedly changing economic environment due to the financial crisis. 
Finally, the survey results are utilized in a simple model describing the hedging behaviour of Czech 
exporting firms.  
Since the key information necessary for this research is not a part of the official statistics, the data 
were collected through our own survey. The survey was conducted using questionnaires distributed to 
a selected set of exporting firms. In addition, local bank representatives were interviewed. 
 
2. Recent Studies on Hedging Behaviour 
Hedging of foreign exchange exposures draws the attention of both academic and policy-oriented 
research. The available empirical studies on foreign exchange hedging suggest that hedging of foreign 
exchange exposures is a significant part of risk management in many companies. To our knowledge, 
the hedging behaviour of Czech firms has not previously been studied to an extent comparable with 
this paper. In the following text we review some of the most recent studies on foreign exchange 
hedging based on either questionnaire-type data or data obtained from databases.  
Empirical studies of hedging behaviour employing data from large databases are rare, mostly because 
of the very limited availability of firm-level foreign exchange hedging data. Fabling and Grimes 
(2008a, 2008b) take advantage of the information-rich New Zealand Customs database and study the 
hedging behaviour of New Zealand firms. The authors find strong evidence of both optimal and 
selective hedging. According to selective hedging theory, firms tend to lock their exchange rates when 
rates are perceived to be low. Optimal hedging theory assumes that firms’ hedging decision is related 
to issues such as the risk of financial distress, the risk of underinvestment, scale factors, corporate 
governance and ownership. No evidence is found for the hypothesis that firms can anticipate currency 
movements, i.e. that firms hedge and a currency movement that would be unfavourable in the absence 
of hedging occurs in the future. Also, no evidence is found for the hypothesis that firms tend to make 
their hedging decisions based on the difference in short-term interest rates between New Zealand and  
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other countries. Finally, firms predominantly hedge their short-term exposures and remain exposed to 
medium-term volatility. 
A large database is also employed by Bartram et al. (2006), who use data on more than 7,000 
companies from 50 countries to study the determinants of using financial derivatives. The data come 
from the Thomson Analytics and Global Reports databases. While the sample size is an obvious 
advantage here, it comes at certain costs. The only information on the use of derivatives for each firm 
is binary – hedger versus non-hedger. Although a set of determinants of using derivatives to hedge 
was identified, using this kind of data cannot explain hedging behaviour more deeply. 
The remaining related empirical studies are based on smaller samples, typically gathered through 
questionnaires.
1 
  Focusing not on hedging directly but rather on the issue of currency denomination, Friberg and 
Wilander (2008) and Fendel et al. (2008) run surveys among exporters in Sweden and Germany 
respectively. Friberg and Wilander (2008) employ a questionnaire based on the answers of 256 
Swedish companies to learn a number of insightful results. For most transactions, the price, invoice 
and settlement currency are the same. The currency of the customer is used mostly, but bargaining 
power also plays a role. Interestingly, no big difference is found between currency denominations in 
the cases of intra-firm and between-firm trade. As for size, small exporters are more likely to use the 
domestic currency for their exports. Finally, neither the expected path of the exchange rate nor the 
availability of financial instruments is important for the choice of currency. Using a sample of 90 
companies, Fendel et al. (2008) show that the majority of German exporters (70%) price exports in the 
currency of customers. Exporters using the currency of customers add an additional mark-up to the 
price. 
The studies most closely related to our paper are those using questionnaires to identify patterns of 
hedging behaviour in different countries (Davies et al., 2006; De Ceuster et al., 2000; Hagelin and 
Pramborg, 2004). Davies et al. (2006) use a sample of 81 Norwegian exporters. The authors 
emphasize two possible sources of foreign exchange hedging – external, using financial derivatives, 
and internal. Specifically, they recognize matching/netting, leading/lagging, pricing considerations, 
foreign borrowing, foreign bank accounts and balance sheet hedging as internal methods of hedging. 
Altogether, 70% of firms use some kind of hedging, with bigger companies being more intensive 
hedgers (79%) than smaller ones (57%). Among the most frequently used types of hedging are 
matching/netting (53%) and currency forwards (38%). When identifying the determinants of hedging 
decisions, the authors find firm size, the extent of internationalization and liquidity to be the most 
important drivers behind the decision to hedge against currency risk. 
Focusing on the use of financial instruments to hedge against foreign exchange and other risks, 
De Ceuster et al. (2000) survey large Belgian non-financial firms. They base their results on a sample 
of 73 firms. Out of these, 66% use financial derivatives. Among the risks which are hedged by 
financial instruments, the most important is currency risk, followed by interest rate risk. Among the 
most important reasons for not using derivatives are i) restrictions imposed by the board of directors, 
                                                           
1 Typically, questionnaire-based surveys have a relatively low number of surveyed companies, especially 
compared to database-based ones. The exception is the study of Bodnar et al. (2011) with 1,161 responses, 
although this comes at the cost of an extremely large initial sample (the response rate was 2%).                          
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ii) risk related to using derivatives, iii) insignificance of exposure and iv) the existence of other 
hedging alternatives. Firms hedging currency risk (47 out of the 49 firms using derivatives) primarily 
hedge current contracts (70%) and transactions anticipated within one year (68%). About 20% of firms 
hedging currency risk also hedge anticipated transactions beyond one year. The most favoured 
derivatives in hedging currency risks are forwards, followed by swaps, over-the-counter options and 
structured contracts.  
Hagelin and Pramborg (2004) evaluate data obtained using a relatively short questionnaire on the 
hedging behaviour of Swedish firms. Based on a sample of 101 to 130 companies, the authors find a 
significant reduction in foreign exchange exposure from the use of financial hedges, in the form of 
either foreign-denominated debt or currency derivatives. 
For large companies, one might opt to find hedging information in firms’ financial publications 
instead of collecting them via a questionnaire. Döhring (2008) uses data based on national sources 
(compiled and provided by the ECB) and information gathered from the financial publications of 33 
large multinational non-financial firms included in the EuroStoxx50 index. He analyses hedging and 
invoicing strategies for reducing the exchange rate exposures of euro-area exporters. The paper finds 
that euro-area exporters have instruments at their disposal to limit the adverse impact of euro 
movements and that they use them. The euro is the dominant invoicing currency for euro-area exports 
to the rest of the EU countries and accounts for roughly half of euro-area exports outside of the EU; 
this approach thus noticeably shifts transaction risk to foreign importers. Data on 33 selected large 
firms revealed that a majority of them use a mix of forwards, options and swaps, but exchange rate 
forwards dominate. These firms also refer to natural hedging (they systematically match the currencies 
of revenues and expenditures as well as of assets and liabilities) and roughly half of them centralize 
hedging of the group’s net foreign exchange exposure. 
 
3. Foreign Trade and Exchange Rate Developments in 2005–2009 
Given the high openness of the Czech economy, foreign trade is considered to be an important 
factor of GDP growth. In this context it is useful to point out the high import intensity of Czech 
exports and the close economic interconnection with EU countries. Exports are driven mainly by 
machinery and transport equipment, which comprises approximately 50% of overall exports.
2 As 
for the regional breakdown, about 85% of Czech exports head to the European Union (about 66% 
to the Eurozone).
3 
The foreign trade turnover of the Czech Republic rose markedly in the period under review, 
mainly in 2004 after it joined the European Union (see Figure 3-1). This trend was visible until 
the beginning of the global financial crisis, which sharply dampened the foreign trade activities of 
Czech firms (see Figure 3-2).  
 
                                                           
2 Source: Czech Statistical Office (CZSO). 
3 Source: CZSO.  
6   Vlastimil Čadek, Helena Rottová, Branislav Saxa 
 
  6
Figure 3-1: Foreign Trade               Figure 3-2: Export and Import Growth  












Source: CZSO                                         Source: CZSO 
 
The global economic slowdown in 2008 and downturn in 2009 significantly hit the dynamics of 
both exports and imports. Exports plummeted by 10.5% in year-on-year comparison in 2009;
4 
since 2000 they had been recording annual average growth of 12% (see Figure 3-2). Although the 
koruna exchange rate weakened significantly at the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009 (see 
Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4), this change could not support real export growth noticeably under the 
given circumstances. The generally accepted idea that a weakening of the domestic currency 
positively influences international competitiveness did not work in the crisis period because of the 












Nevertheless, the weaker domestic currency in general helped exporters to maintain profitability 
on exports in this period, although only for those exporters who had not hedged against a local 
                                                           

















Exports of goods and services












2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Exports of goods and services
Imports of goods and services
GDP (annual percentage changes) 
Figure 3-3: Exchange Rate Developments 










 1/01  1/02  1/03  1/04 1/05  1/06  1/07  1/08 1/09
Figure 3-4: CZK/EUR and CZK/USD 








 1/01  1/02  1/03  1/04  1/05  1/06  1/07  1/08  1/09                         
                                                           Hedging Behaviour of Czech Exporting Firms    7       
  
  7
currency appreciation or who had used suitable hedging strategies and instruments so that they 
could benefit from the marked currency weakening.  
In this context it is worth mentioning that some firms do not make a distinction between hedging 
and speculation. Firms used higher leverage to improve the foreign exchange rate for their 
“hedging” operations, but this was in fact speculation on a continued firming of the domestic 
currency. Such firms thus became vulnerable to a local currency weakening, which materialized 
during the global crisis. 
Central and Eastern European currencies weakened significantly at the end of 2008 and the 
beginning of 2009. This was a milestone for such speculators. Due to their high leverage, firms 
were forced to deliver more foreign currency than they could obtain from their exports. 
Consequently, they had to buy expensive foreign currency in the market and sell it to their banks 
for cheaper “hedged” foreign exchange rates. The losses from such operations and the 
plummeting global demand were a lethal combination which often led to bankruptcy. 
On the other hand, some exporters were in a similar situation not because of the leverage in their 
financial instruments, but because they had hedged expected trades according to their financial 
plan. Due to the crisis, exports were lower, the plan was not fulfilled and these exporters also 
faced a shortage of foreign currency, which they were obliged to sell. 
In the event of a significant default by exporters on their hedging operations, banks would be hurt 
badly. This poses a risk to financial stability. This is one of the reasons to watch the hedging 
behaviour of local exporters, as such information could give an early sign of potential danger for 
the local banking sector. 
 
4. Research Methodology and Respondent Selection 
As the available firm-level data do not include information on the hedging behaviour of Czech 
exporting firms, our research is based mainly on information obtained from questionnaires. The 
statistics on foreign exchange derivatives are also of very limited use, mainly because of the high 
level of aggregation and the impossibility of distinguishing hedging transactions from speculative 
ones (carry trades etc.).  
The questionnaire contained two types of questions (see the appendix for the full questionnaire). 
The introductory questions, relating to the basic characteristic of the company (e.g. sales, exports 
and imports volumes and export destinations), were limited. The majority of the questions were 
focused on specific aspects of firms’ hedging behaviour. In particular, we were interested in the 
extent of firms’ hedged exports, their practices in using specific hedging instruments and, last but 
not least, the impact of export hedging/non-hedging on economic results. We  also wondered 
whether and how the recent financial crisis had changed exporters’ hedging habits. The 
questionnaire included both quantitative and qualitative questions. The incentives for hedging or 
not hedging were not surveyed. Special attention was paid to formulating the questionnaire  
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questions clearly. Furthermore, in order to increase the likelihood of response, we only selected 
types of information of the greatest interest and thus kept the questionnaire relatively short.  
The survey respondents were selected from the 2007 database of the Czech Statistical Office (the 
most recent one available). The database contains information on almost 41,500 firms, of which 
approximately 12,000 export their production abroad. A sample of 2,330 firms that export at least 
50% of their total earnings or at least CZK 1 billion was selected. In the end, out of the 2,330 
questionnaires sent to firms we received 184 consistent answers. 
In addition to information collected via the questionnaire, we obtained more specific information 
about exporters’ behaviour by conducting interviews with local bank representatives 
(e.g. information on whether leverage is used in hedging structures and information on the banks’ 
approach to exposures in the exporters sector). In the end, this additional source of information 
was evaluated as very important, not least because banks have a relatively good knowledge of 
firms’ hedging behaviour (such information is “amassed” there). Besides, it was useful to obtain 
information about banks’ reaction to the recent crisis, notably whether they had changed their 
stance on customers’ hedging operations. This extra information was also very helpful for cross 
checking the information obtained from the questionnaire. 
Following sections summarize the main findings of the questionnaire and interviews. Most of the 
results relate to two time periods (2005–2008 and 2009), as we are also interested in possible 
changes in the respondents’ hedging behaviour during the crisis. 
 
5. Basic Information on the Survey Sample  
The final survey sample contains information on 184 exporting firms, i.e. it is comparable in size 
to similar questionnaire studies.
5 Since not all of the firms answered all the questions, the number 
of firms analysed differs question by question.  
In 2009, the respondents recorded total earnings of CZK 400 billion, i.e. approximately 7.4% less 
compared to the yearly average of the previous period (2005–2008).
6 At the same time, average 
exports declined by 3.3% to CZK 1.5 billion due to the global economic crisis. Table 5-1 shows 







                                                           
5 Friberg and Wilander (2008) work with 256 companies, Fendel et al. (2008) with 90 companies, Davies et al. 
(2006) with 81 companies, Hagelin and Pramborg (2004) with 101 to 130 companies in three samples and finally 
De Ceuster et al. (2000) with 73 companies 
6 On average the respondents recorded total earnings of CZK 2.3 billion in 2009.                           
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Table 5-1: Sample Characteristics Distribution 
  Number of Employees 
  sub–25  25–49  50–149   150 or more 
Sample 17.7%  16.0%  22.7% 43.6%
2,330 firms  35.1%  16.3%  24.9% 23.6%
  Total Earnings (CZK mil.) 
  sub–50 50–99  100–499  500  or  more 
Sample 18.2%  11.4%  39.2% 31.3%
2,330 firms  36.2%  15.6%  29.9% 18.3%
  Exports (CZK mil.) 
  sub–50 50–99  100–499  500  or  more 
Sample 21.3%  14.9%  39.7% 24.1%
2,330 firms  40.7%  16.5%  27.9% 14.9%
 
The table gives an idea about the direction of the sample selection bias. It shows that the smallest 
firms are under-represented in our survey, even when compared to our initial sample of 2,330 
companies. The share of mid-size companies corresponds to our initial sample and, consequently, 
the biggest firms are over-represented. While such selection bias has important consequences for 
the conclusions about individual firms, our final sample covers a relatively big proportion of 
aggregate exports from the Czech Republic. Regarding the territorial distribution the largest 
proportion of exports heads to Europe. In this respect, in our final sample exports to the Eurozone 
are over-represented and exports to the rest of Europe are under-represented, while the share of 
Europe as a whole reflects the aggregate share (slightly above 90%, see Table 5-2). 
 
Table 5-2: Regional Distribution of Local Exports 




Eurozone 70.0%  58.4%
Rest of Europe  23.1%  33.3%
America 1.8%  2.6%
Africa 0.4%  1.0%
Asia, Australia  4.7%  4.6%
Not specified  0.0%  0.1%
 
The shares are calculated as averages weighted by the individual exports of the given companies. 
The territorial distribution of exports is apparently the key factor of the currency share distribution 
of payments in euro (see Table 5-3). 
                                                           
7 Source: Czech Statistical Office data for 2009, [cit. 10-20-10], accessible from www: 
<http://apl.czso.cz/pll/stazo/STAZO.STAZO?jazyk=EN&prvni_pristup=>  
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The low proportion of CZK-denominated exports is not surprising. It should not, however, be 
attributed only to the low bargaining power of local exporters. Although exporting in local 
currency mitigates short-term exposure to FX risk, the exporter is not completely independent of 
local currency movements. Continued appreciation of the local currency leads to a loss of 
international competitiveness because the exporter’s production becomes increasingly expensive 
for its customers abroad. Therefore, even an exporter receiving CZK is exposed to FX risk, but in 
a different way than an exporter receiving foreign currency (the latter, unlike the former, is 
exposed to future cash flow volatility). Companies hedging their exchange rate risk could lose 
competitiveness in the long run as well, although the use of suitable hedging strategies can at least 
slow down the effect of local currency appreciation. 
 
6. Hedging Strategy 
This section summarizes the extent to which Czech exporters hedge their FX exposures, the 
instruments and maturities they use to hedge, and the perceived rate of success.  
The results show that about one third of the companies surveyed do not hedge their FX exposures 
at all (Table 6-1). More specifically, in the period of 2005–2008, only 28.2% of exporters were 
fully unhedged; in 2009 that share rose to 30.4%. On the other hand, approximately 23.8% and 
22.7% of respondents were fully hedged in the respective time periods. The number of fully 
unhedged respondents thus increased in 2009, while the number of those who were fully hedged 
decreased. Overall, just over 60% of exporters hedged their FX exposures either partially or fully. 
Besides firms with FX exposures, about 5.5% of firms receive payments for their exports in CZK 
only. Such firms do not use any hedging instruments as they do not have any FX exposure. The 
weighted average rate of hedging
8 in our sample was 88.1% in 2005–2008 and 87.5% in 2009. 
When limited to those who hedge against exchange rate risk, the weighted average rate of hedging 
was 93.4% and 94.5% in 2005–2008 and 2009 respectively.  
 
 
                                                           
8 The average share of hedged exports in total exports, weighted by the exports of the individual companies.                          
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Table 6-1: Approach to Hedging 
   2005–2008 2009 
Fully unhedged  28.2%  30.4%
Partially hedged  39.2%  37.6%
Fully hedged  23.8%  22.7%
100% paid in CZK  5.5%  5.5%
No response  3.3%  3.9%
 
Due to our focus on exporters with high exports-to-sales ratios and big exporters, our weighted 
average rate of hedging does not necessarily reflect the nationwide rate of hedging.
9 The lower is 
the share of exports in a company’s sales, the lower is the volatility of its revenue due to FX risk 
and thus probably the lower is the incentive to hedge against FX risk.
10 The nationwide rate of 
hedging is therefore likely to be lower than our sample weighted average of 88%. Once we adjust 
the weights to reflect the firm size distribution in our initial sample of 2,330 companies (Table 5-
1), the adjusted average rate of hedging decreases to 85%. 
Regarding the choice of hedging methods, the survey revealed that the most popular hedging 
instruments are natural hedging and outright forwards (see Table 6-2).
11 Almost 60% of hedged 
exports are hedged using natural hedging, while the rest are covered mostly by financial 
derivatives. The use of other instruments is negligible. The results also suggest that there was no 
substantial change in the choice of hedging instruments between 2005–2008 and 2009. 
Table 6-2: Breakdown by Instrument (averages in per cent of exports) 
 
   simple avg.  weighted avg.  simple avg.  weighted avg. 
   2005–2008 2005–2008  2009  2009 
Natural hedging  34.0%  53.0% 34.1% 56.4% 
Forward 25.1%  37.6% 26.7% 35.6% 
Operational hedging  0.2%  0.0% 1.2% 0.1% 
FX loan  2.7%  0.6% 3.1% 0.6% 
FX swap  1.2%  0.2% 0.4% 0.1% 
Option 3.0%  1.8% 3.3% 1.5% 
Surcharge 3.9%  0.3% 3.2% 0.2% 
Total average  70.2%  93.4% 72.1% 94.5% 
 
                                                           
9 Self-selection bias might be an issue too – firms that do not hedge might be less interested in filling in the 
questionnaire compared to hedgers. 
10 The relationship between a firm’s size and its exports/sales ratio on the one hand and its likelihood to hedge on 
the other hand is estimated in section 9. 
11 The weighted averages presented in this table are calculated only for companies that hedge at least part of their 
exports. The weights used are the export volumes of the individual companies in the given time period.  
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The shares of maturities of derivatives changed to only a limited extent during the crisis (see 
Table 6-3). The majority of exporters continued to set their typical derivatives maturity at 3 
months to one year (53% and 57% of companies in 2005–2008 and 2009 respectively). Although 
the response rate to that question was by far the lowest of all the questions in the questionnaire 
(around 35%) this was mainly because the remaining exporters do not hedge at all or do not use 
derivatives. 
 
Table 6-3: Relative Numbers of Companies Using Particular Maturities 
   2005–2008 2009 
up to 3 month (incl.)  30.0% 20.6%
3 months – 1 year (incl.)  52.9% 57.1%
above 1 year  17.1% 22.2%
 
The timing of hedging is another key aspect of exporters’ hedging behaviour (see Table 6-4
12). 
The responses showed that more than half of the firms hedge consistently.
13 In addition, around 
60% of exporters use a kind of active approach and hedge either when the koruna is weak by 
historical comparison or when they expect the koruna to appreciate. The motivation for such 
behaviour is to take advantage of currency moves and fix the exchange rate at moments when it is 
viewed more favourably. Rather surprisingly, only 7% of firms hedge when the current CZK FX 
rate is strong by historical comparison. The motivation for their behaviour is different – when the 
local currency strengthens to a level seen by the firm as critical, the firm fixes the exchange rate at 
this level to prevent further loss. Finally, seasonal hedging is relatively infrequent among the 
firms surveyed.  
Table 6-4: Ways of Hedging (relative number of exporters; multiple choice) 
Consistently 53.1%
Seasonally 7.1%
If the current CZK FX rate is strong by historical comparison 7.1%
If the current CZK FX rate is weak by historical comparison  22.4%
If according to a forecast the koruna is expected to firm  38.8%
In a different way   4.1%
 
Table 6-5 reveals whether firms’ strategies were seen as successful or not. In both periods under 
review, being hedged was seen as more advantageous than not being hedged. The difference in 
perceived success between “hedged” and “unhedged” respondents is much smaller in 2009, 
reflecting the fact that the CZK FX rate was much weaker by historical comparison during that 
                                                           
12 Multiple choice was allowed for this question, therefore the sum in the table is not equal to 100%.  
13 These respondents use both natural hedging and forwards.                           




14 The weakening of the koruna mainly decreased the value of longer-term hedging strategies 
(given that the most popular derivatives are FX forwards). Nevertheless, it is necessary to note 
that the weakening of the koruna was rather short lived. 
 
Table 6-5: “Rates of Success”(relative number of exporters)
15 
   2005–2008 2009 
due to hedging you had a better FX rate on average (including hedging costs)  30.4% 22.7%
due to hedging you had a worse FX rate on average (including hedging costs)  11.0% 17.1%
due to hedging you had around the same FX rate on average (incl. hedging costs)  9.4% 12.2%
due to not hedging against FX risk you had FX gains  7.7% 11.0%
due to not hedging against FX risk you had FX losses  18.8% 13.8%
due to not hedging against FX risk you had neither FX gains nor losses  7.7% 6.6%
no reply  14.9% 16.0%
 
We also attempt to assess whether active hedgers
16 were more successful than those hedging 
consistently. For this purpose we compare the answers to two questions from the questionnaire 
(this is in fact a partially aggregated cross-tabulation of Table 6-4 and Table 6-5; for the former 
we took into account only those who had chosen only one answer to the respective question). 
During the period of koruna appreciation (2005–2008) active hedgers were more successful than 
those who were hedging consistently (see Table 6-6). On the contrary, in 2009 the active hedging 
strategy brought much worse results than in the previous period. This is to some extent the result 
of an unexpected and sharp weakening of the koruna in the first quarter of 2009.  
 
Table 6-6: Results of Different Hedging Approaches (relative number of exporters)
17 
 
   2005–2008 2009 
   + - 0 + - 0 
Hedging  consistently  45% 33% 23% 38% 33% 28%
Active  hedging  60% 20% 20% 40% 45% 15%
 
                                                           
14 The koruna depreciated to almost 30 EUR/CZK, a level last seen in October 2005. 
15 A hedged exporter is one with a hedging rate of at least 30% of its exports. 
16 Those who answered “If the current CZK FX rate is weak by historical comparison” and “If according to a 
forecast the koruna is expected to firm” in Table 6-4. 
17 A positive sign means a positive impact on the financial results, a negative sign means a negative impact and 
zero stands for neither a positive nor a negative impact.  
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As for the source of foreign exchange forecasts, most firms rely on banks’ forecasts (67% of 
exporters, see Table 6-7). Home-made forecasts placed second with 46.1%, while roughly one 
third of respondents follow forecasts published in the media.  
 
Table 6-7: FX Forecast Source (relative number of exporters; multiple choice) 
Consensus Forecast  4.7%
Banks 67.2%
Home-made 46.1%




As exporters were generally quite successful in managing their FX risk, it is no great surprise that 
they do not plan to change their behaviour noticeably. This finding is apparent from Table 6-8, 
which shows the survey results in more detail. 
 
Table 6-8: Exporters’ Plans for the Future (relative number of exporters) 
No change  76.2% 
We will start/are starting to hedge committed trades only  3.3% 
We will start/are starting to use different instruments  8.8% 
We will reduce/are reducing hedging (as a % of exports)  3.9% 
We will stop hedging totally  2.2% 
No reply  5.5% 
 
On the other hand, it is rather startling that 93% of exporters whose hedging or non-hedging had a 
negative impact on their economic results in both time periods stated that they were not planning 
any change of their hedging behaviour. Since their average export volume was CZK 481 million 
in 2009, many of them are probably not too small to hedge.  
If we compare our results with exporters’ hedging behaviour in other countries, we find that it is 
more or less similar. The majority of exports are hedged, although the intensity differs across 
countries. One factor that differs significantly is the share of exports in local currency. While our 
research shows a share of only around 5% in the Czech Republic, Fabling and Grimes (2008a) 
show a share of around 40% in New Zealand and Fendel et al. (2008) state that the share of 
exports in the currency of customers is 70% in Germany. However, the proportion of exports in 
local currency is determined to large extent by the structure of export destinations as well as the 
global importance of the local currency.                           
                                                           Hedging Behaviour of Czech Exporting Firms    15       
  
  15
7. Findings of Interviews with Bank Representatives 
Simultaneously with running the questionnaire survey we interviewed bank representatives. The 
idea was motivated by our expectation that banks are well informed about their clients and their 
operations and thus could provide us with valuable information about some aspects of their 
clients’ transactions that would be difficult to collect via the questionnaire. Since we wanted to 
keep the questionnaire sent to exporting firms as simple as possible (in order to achieve a high 
response rate), we avoided in-depth questions (e.g. about financial derivatives) which might have 
resulted in a much lower response rate. 
We interviewed representatives of the five banks with the largest client derivative business in the 
local market. These banks were chosen on the basis of the foreign exchange market turnover 
survey conducted by the Czech National Bank four times a year.  
One observation is that the banks’ answers and views are very homogenous. This facilitates 
comparison with the questionnaire findings as well as confirming that banks are well aware of 
their clients’ transactions and that the information obtained from the interviews is relevant. In 
general, banks are more risk averse after the crisis and clients
18 prefer simpler instruments and 
strategies. Nowadays, banks assess clients more strictly and pay more attention to their operations 
and the ways they address their FX risk. 
One of the interview findings is that, even after the crisis, banks are continuing to allow their 
clients to hedge not only their committed trades, but also their anticipated trades. However, 
something has changed: before the crisis the banks’ approach was more relaxed, as they allowed 
their clients to hedge their FX exposures more aggressively. For example, it was not exceptional 
to see hedging for three or four years in advance. Nowadays, it is usually possible to hedge trades 
anticipated within one year only. According to the banks, the average maturity of hedging 
instruments is around six months. 
As for the instrument type, forwards are the most popular among exporters after the crisis. 
Somewhat in contrast to the questionnaire results, according to the banks the share of forwards 
was almost the same as the share of options and option structures before the crisis. Generally, 
options are more popular among bigger institutional clients. Option structures dominate option 
business as exporters are reluctant to pay option premiums. Therefore, zero-cost structures are the 
most popular. Banks estimate that of the exporters who buy either options or option structures, 
only up to 5% buy the simple option and pay the premium.  
Option structures are closely linked to leverage. In the past, banks allowed their clients to have a 
higher level of leverage in their derivatives compared to the present levels, although it has never 
been very high. Also, clients’ attitude to leverage has changed after the crisis. Most of the banks 
interviewed allow a maximum leverage of 1:1.5
19 nowadays. Leverage was present in about 80–
90% of exporters’ derivatives before the crisis; now their share is estimated to be around 50%. In 
                                                           
18 Since the interview was strictly about exporters and their operations, the findings are not necessarily relevant 
to all clients. 
19 For example, two options in a zero-cost structure with face amounts of EUR 500,000 and EUR 750,000.  
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addition to leverage, exotic option barriers are used to make an option strategy more attractive 
than a simple forward. Typically, knock-in type barriers are used, as the use of the knock-out type 
in hedging strategies is problematic. 
Nowadays, banks request collateral against exporters’ derivatives positions more often than 
before the crisis, although it is still used only rarely. It is applied on a very individual basis where 
a client has a high risk profile or a transaction has a risky origin. This way, banks try to avoid 
large losses if clients default on their trades. Only rare collateralization means that exporters do 
not need to deliver any other capital after a purchase of a certain financial derivative. For 
example, in the case of a significant weakening of the domestic currency (as witnessed at the 
beginning of 2009) exporters would not be called for additional money because of the drop in the 
market value of their derivative portfolio. 
According to the banks, the majority of exporters prefer active hedging. Around 50–70% of them 
try to find more attractive FX levels to start hedging their exposure. Clients tend to panic when the 
koruna is strengthening, but on the other hand they often shift the entry level to weaker values 
when the FX rate is depreciating. In the course of time, clients are seen to be becoming more 
responsible and, after the crisis, even more conservative. Banks admit that “panic selling” is less 
present and clients are more successful in finding local peaks of the FX rate nowadays. On the 
other hand, they often lack self-discipline and do not keep to their previously chosen levels, such 
as target and stop-loss levels. Therefore, they are sometimes a step behind the FX market.  
The banks also mentioned one way of hedging where clients hedge their so-called “calculation FX 
rate”. This is used for valuation of their exports in the local currency and is usually set firmer than 
current FX levels. Some “speculating” clients thus wait for a weaker FX rate, although only until 
their market rate gets close to their calculation FX rate. At this moment they are forced to hedge 
to be at least at their calculation FX rate. Some clients are able to gain an extra profit on FX rate 
volatility on top of their core business, although this should not be the motivation to hedge. 
When it comes to the timing of hedging, the question of consultation is also important. Banks 
cannot advise their clients directly on whether current FX levels are suitable for hedging or not 
without signing a special agreement.
20 Banks do not provide such a service to exporters. Instead, 
they focus on providing an in-depth description of financial derivatives and their strengths and 
weaknesses, but the final decision is always up to the client. From time to time, banks also submit 
investment recommendations with a legal disclaimer. The only agreement signed with clients is a 
general agreement on derivatives trading, which is usually based on the EMA.
21 
Finally, the banks were interviewed about the estimated volume of derivatives that exporters use 
for hedging purposes. Banks mentioned that the volume plunged at the outbreak of the crisis 
together with the decline in the export volume. On the other hand, the return towards previous 
volumes is much slower than the increase in foreign trade turnover. The minimum nominal value 
of a forward that can be dealt with a client is usually around EUR 10,000, while the minimum 
                                                           
20 One of the main goals of the 2004 European directive known as MiFID (Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive) is consumer protection in investment services. MiFID regulates the relationship between bank and 
client in such areas as investment consultancy.  
21 The Master Agreement for Financial Transactions prepared by the Czech Banking Association in accordance 
with European Banking Federation documentation.                          
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option face value is usually EUR 50,000. These amounts should, however, be taken with caution, 
as many banks do not apply a strict minimum limit (the conditions also depend on the client 
relationship, current market conditions, etc.). 
 
8. Comparison of the Questionnaire and the Interview Results  
To a large extent the banks confirmed the questionnaire findings and also provided additional 
information about exporters’ hedging behaviour. The only significant discrepancy is in the choice 
of derivatives. While exporters claim to use forwards and natural hedging as primary tools and 
their reported share of options is very small, banks see the share of forwards and options as being 
more balanced. Banks also see quite a big rise in forwards after the crisis, while according to the 
survey questionnaire exporters changed the shares of individual instruments only marginally. 
The reasons behind these differences are not clear. A prominent hypothesis is that exporters do 
not distinguish between outright forward and zero-cost option structures, as such an option 
strategy is in fact a synthetic forward. When discussing with exporters, we noticed that they often 
recognize the general features of financial derivatives but do not know their exact names. 
Therefore, it is possible that some exporters consider zero-cost as a forward and only a simple 
option purchase as an option. 
We also see similar results in the share of active hedgers. Banks confirmed that 50–70% of 
exporters are active hedgers, i.e. they try to find attractive CZK FX rate levels for their hedging.  
 
9. Determinants of Hedging Decisions and Profitability of Hedging 
In the first part of this section, we exploit firm-level data to identify the factors influencing the 
decision to hedge on financial markets. For estimation purposes, we match the questionnaire data 
with the annual firm-level data reported to the Czech Statistical Office. Thus, besides the 
questionnaire data described in previous sections, we use two firm-level variables constructed 
using the Czech Statistical Office database: the group sales ratio and the percentage of foreign 
capital.
22  
Empirical research modelling the hedging behaviour of firms is scarce. The available literature 
identifies firm size, sector, export intensity, the geographic dispersion of the countries in which 
the firm operates and liquidity to be relevant factors in firms’ hedging decisions (Allayannis et al., 
2001; Fabling and Grimes, 2008b; Davies et al., 2006). Closest to our model specifications, 
Allayannis et al. (2001) use the financial hedge dummy as the dependent variable. To test whether 
financial and operational hedging are substitutes or complements, their set of explanatory 
variables includes the ratio of domestic to foreign sales as well as a geographic dispersion proxy, 
the number of countries and the number of regions in which firms operate.  
                                                           
22 As yearly firm-level data are available with significant time lag, we use the 2007 database.  
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Our model specifications are shown in Table 9-1. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating 
whether or not a firm hedges using financial instruments (i.e. forwards, swaps or options). Three 
specifications are considered and estimated. In specification (a), the decision to hedge is supposed 
to be explained by the size of the firm (proxied by the logarithm of sales), the ratio of exports to 
sales and the ratio of exports to imports. The inclusion of size is motivated by the expectation that 
bigger exporters are more likely to hedge on the financial markets compared to smaller ones, for 
example because of the existence of minimum thresholds for hedging instruments. The 
relationship between firm size and hedging on financial markets can be clearly seen, for example, 
in Figure B-1 in Appendix B, which shows the firm size distribution for hedgers and non-hedgers. 
With a higher ratio of exports to sales, the firm’s overall financial situation is expected to be more 
sensitive to exchange rate changes and such firm to be more motivated to hedge. The ratio of 
exports to imports is supposed to be a possible proxy for natural hedging.  
As the estimated coefficients show, firm size and the ratio of exports to sales are both statistically 
significant and economically substantial determinants of the decision to hedge on financial 
markets. On the other hand, the ratio of exports to imports does not help to explain the decision to 
hedge at all. 
In specification (b), the percentage of foreign capital and the group sales ratio are included to 
reflect the possibly lower need to hedge if the firm has a foreign owner or operates within a 
multinational group. In line with intuition, the coefficients are negative and in almost all 
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Table 9-1: Determinants of Hedging Using Financial Instruments 
(probit type estimation; dependent variable is dummy indicating whether or not firm hedges on 
financial markets) 
  (a) (b)  (c) 
  pre-crisis crisis  pre-crisis  crisis  pre-crisis  crisis 
  years year  years  year  years  year 
                  
Sales (in logarithm)  0,19  *** 0,15 **  0,30 ** 0,35 **  0,37  **  0,41 ***
  (0,06)    (0,06)   (0,13)   (0,14)   (0,15)    (0,14)  
Export/Sales  1,21 **  1,25 **  2,33 ** 2,74 **  2,56 **  2,76 ** 
  (0,54)    (0,54)   (1,09)   (1,07)   (1,16)    (1,13)  
Export/Import  0,00    0,00   0,03  0,01  0,02   0,01  
  (0,00)    (0,00)   (0,02)   (0,01)   (0,02)    (0,02)  
Percentage of foreign          -0,01   -0,02 *  -0,02  *  -0,03 ** 
capital         (0,01)   (0,01)   (0,01)    (0,01)  
Group sales ratio          -0,77 *  -1,12 **  -0,82  *  -1,17 ** 
         (0,44)   (0,49)   (0,44)    (0,50)  
Constant  -3,57 *** -3,13 *** -4,76 ** -4,94 **  -0,01 *  -0,01 * 
  (0,99)    (0,96)   (2,42)   (2,29)   (0,01)    (0,01)  
Share of exports                  -4,95  *  -4,52 * 
hedged  naturally                (2,56)    (2,35)  
                    
Pseudo  R-squared  0,07    0,06   0,17  0,22  0,21   0,27  
Number of observations  145     146    70    71    70     71   
                    
 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Finally, in specification (c), the share of exports hedged naturally as reported by firms is added to 
the determinants. The fact that the coefficient is statistically significant shows that, in line with 
intuition, natural hedging decreases the need for hedging on financial markets.  
Probit estimation is used in all the specifications, as the dependent variable is binary.
23 The 
number of observations varies for two reasons. First, some firms answered the questions for only 
one of the two time periods. Second, once the variables constructed using the CZSO database are 
included, the number of usable observations drops substantially.  
In the second estimation, we aim to identify the determinants of the profitability of hedging or 
non-hedging. As Table 9-2  shows, the use of financial instruments to hedge exports is 
significantly profitable compared to not hedging, whether estimated without control variables 
                                                           
23 Besides the probit specification, a two-stage setup was estimated. The decision to hedge on financial markets 
was modelled in the first stage, while the ratio of exports hedged on financial markets was modelled in the 
second stage. However, none of the coefficients in the second stage turned out to be significant (the estimation is 
not shown here).  
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(specifications (a) and (b)) or with them (specifications (c) and (d)). Comparing the pre-crisis 
period and the crisis year 2009, which was characterized by reversal of the long-term appreciation 
trend, one can see that the positive effect of hedging using financial instruments decreased in 2009 
but remained positive and significant. Besides hedging using financial instruments, natural 
hedging and operational hedging turn out to be profitable in specifications (a) and (b). Again, 
probit estimation is a natural choice here, as the dependent variable is binary. The number of 
observations varies for the same reasons as in the previous estimations.  
 
Table 9-2: Determinants of Profitability of Hedging or Non-Hedging 
(dependent variable is dummy indicating whether firm profited from more favourable exchange rate as 
a result of its decision to hedge or not to hedge) 
  Specification 
  (a) (b) (c)  (d) 
 
pre-crisis 





Ratio of exports hedged naturally or operationally 0,005 *  0,008 **  -0,006   0,000    
 (0,003)   (0,003)   (0,006)   (0,005)    
Ratio of exports hedged using financial instruments 0,014 *** 0,007 ** 0,017 ** 0,010 *
 (0,003)   (0,003)   (0,008)   (0,006)    
Ratio of exports hedged by taking loan  0,026   0,007   0,085   0,065   
 (0,021)   (0,012)   (0,056)   (0,065)    
Ratio of export hedged by surcharge  0,003   0,002   -0,071   -0,176   
 (0,007)   (0,009)   (0,133)   (0,207)    
Sales (in logarithm)          -0,182   -0,260 *
         (0,134)   (0,137)    
Export/Sales         -0,339   -0,924    
       (0,898)   (0,935)    
Export/Import         -0,010   -0,005    
       (0,023)   (0,015)    
Percentage of foreign capital          -0,015   0,011   
       (0,014)   (0,012)    
Group sales ratio          -0,101   -0,063   
       (0,428)   (0,430)    
Constant -0,444 *** -0,684 ***  4,115 *  2,726    
 (0,138)   (0,143)   (2,446)   (2,136)    
                  
Pseudo R-squared  0,10   0,05   0,17    0,11  
Number of observations  181    181    70    71   
 
 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, estimated using probit estimation, standard errors in parentheses. 
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Finally, we look at the relationship between the maturity and type of financial market hedging 
instrument. The cross-tabulation in Table 9-3 shows that while forwards and options are 
associated primarily with maturities of three months to one year, swaps are typically chosen for 
hedging over shorter horizons. Nevertheless, forwards are the most popular choice for every 
maturity. 
Table 9-3: Maturity and Instruments 
      Forward  Swap  Option 
7 days – 3 months  18  4  2 










more than 1 year  11  0  4 
 10. Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyse the hedging behaviour of Czech exporting firms using information from 
a questionnaire and interviews. Approximately 60% of the firms surveyed hedge their FX 
exposures, and about 88% of their exports are hedged.
24 Most exporters use natural hedging, i.e. 
they balance incoming and outgoing payments in foreign currency as well as foreign currency 
assets and liabilities. Hedgers on financial markets prefer forwards and zero-cost option 
structures, as they are reluctant to pay option premiums. The most frequent maturity of financial 
instruments is three months to one year. More than one half of exporters hedge consistently, while 
around 60% hedge actively, taking advantage of currency moves. Given the losses some exporters 
suffered during the crisis in 2009, it might be surprising that only a few are considering changing 
their hedging strategy after the crisis.
25 On the other hand, banks suggest that exporters now prefer 
simpler hedging instruments and strategies. Our simple model of hedging behaviour suggests that 
firm size and export-to-sales ratio increase the probability of hedging on financial markets, while 
trading within a group, being owned by a foreign owner or being hedged naturally reduces the 
need for financial hedging.  
From the macroeconomic point of view, the high share of hedged exports in combination with the 
typical maturity of hedging instruments of between three months and one year has two 
consequences. First, exchange rate movements should influence aggregate exports and production 
with a substantial time lag. Second, short-lived exchange rate fluctuations do not have to influence 
aggregate exports and production, even if their magnitude is large. This, however, does not mean 
that such fluctuations do not have substantial impacts on individual firms. In particular, smaller 
exporters and firms with lower export intensity are less likely to hedge and are therefore more 
vulnerable to exchange rate shocks. 
 
 
                                                           
24 When we adjust the weights to reflect the firm size distribution in our initial sample of 2,330 companies, the 
adjusted average rate of hedging decreases to 85%. 
25 According to the questionnaire, 93% of exporters whose hedging or non-hedging had a negative impact on 
their economic results in both time periods stated that they plan no change in their behaviour.  
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Questionnaire sent to survey participants: 
 
1. What were your earnings, exports and imports volumes? 
2005–2008 (approx. average per year 










2. Where are your main trading partners located? (more than one answer possible) 
a) Eurozone (incl. Slovakia.)   - around…..…% of exports 
b) Others in Europe  - around…..…% of exports 
c) America  - around…..…% of exports 
d) Africa  - around…..…% of exports 
e) Asia, Australia  - around…..…% of exports 
 
3. In what currency do you receive payments for your exports? (more than one answer possible)
a) EUR    - around…..…% of exports 
b) USD    - around…..…% of exports 
c) CZK    - around…..…% of exports 
d) GBP   - around…..…% of exports 
e) Others  - around…..…% of exports 
 
4. Approximately what proportion of your exports is usually hedged against FX risk? (please fill in all possible 
answers for both periods of time) 
2005–2008 
a)…….. % of committed trades 
b)……..% of anticipated trades within one year 
c)……..% of anticipated trades in subsequent years 
 
2009 
a)…….. % of committed trades 
b)……..% of anticipated trades within one year 
c)……..% of anticipated trades in subsequent years 
5. What instruments do you use to hedge against currency risk in % of exports? (more than one answer possible)
2005–2008 
a) natural hedging 
b) operational hedging 
c) foreign-denominated debt 
d) outright forward 
e) FX swap 
f) option and option structures 
g surcharges covering possible FX losses 
h) no hedging at all 
2009 
a) natural hedging 
b) operational hedging 
c) foreign-denominated debt 
d) outright forward 
e) FX swap 
f) option and option structures 
g) surcharges covering possible FX losses 
h) no hedging at all                         





6. What is the typical maturity of dealt derivatives (forwards, swaps, options)? (only one answer for each period 
of time) 
2005–2008 
￿ a) shorter than 7 days  around…..…% of exports 
￿ b) 7 days – 3 months (incl.)  around…..…% of exports 
￿ c) 3 months – 1 year (incl.)  around…..…% of exports 
￿ d) longer than 1 year  around…..…% of exports 
 
2009 
￿ a) shorter than 7 days  around…..…% of exports 
￿ b) 7 days – 3 months (incl.)  around…..…% of exports 
￿ c) 3 months – 1 year (incl.)  around…..…% of exports 





7. If your firm hedges against FX risk, does it hedge 
￿ a) consistently 
￿ b) seasonally 
￿ c) if the current CZK FX rate is strong by historical comparison 
￿ d) if the current CZK FX rate is weak by historical comparison 
￿ e) if according to a forecast the koruna is expected to firm 
￿ f) in a different way (please say how) 
 
8. How was your P&L affected by hedging/no hedging? Do you think that in the given period of time:  
2005–2008 
￿ a) due to hedging against FX risk you had a better FX rate on average (including hedging costs) than if 
you had not hedged; 
￿ b) due to hedging against FX risk you had a worse FX rate on average (including hedging costs) than if 
you had not hedged; 
￿ c) due to hedging against FX risk you had around the same FX rate on average (including hedging costs) 
than if you had not hedged; 
￿ d) due to not hedging against FX risk you had FX gains; 
￿ e) due to not hedging against FX risk you had FX losses; 
￿ f) due to not hedging against FX risk you had neither FX gains nor FX losses. 
 
2009 
￿ a) due to hedging against FX risk you had a better FX rate on average (including hedging costs) than if 
you had not hedged; 
￿ b) due to hedging against FX risk you had a worse FX rate on average (including hedging costs) than if 
you had not hedged; 
￿ c) due to hedging against FX risk you had around the same FX rate on average (including hedging costs) 
than if you had not hedged; 
￿ d) due to not hedging against FX risk you had FX gains; 
￿ e) due to not hedging against FX risk you had FX losses; 
￿ f) due to not hedging against FX risk you had neither FX gains nor FX losses. 
 
9. On what FX rate forecasts is your hedging decision based?  
￿ a) Consensus forecast 
￿ b) Banks 
￿ c) Home-made 
￿ d) External advisor 
￿ e) Media 
￿ f) Others 
 
10. Do you expect (or plan) any change in your hedging behaviour due to the recent crisis? (more than one 
answer possible)  
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￿ a) no change 
￿ b) we will start/are starting to hedge committed trades only 
￿ c) we will start/are starting to use different instruments 
￿ d) we will reduce/are reducing hedging (in % of exports) 
￿ e) we will stop hedging totally 
 
 
Explanatory notes to the questionnaire 
 
1. The Eurozone comprises 16 countries (including Slovakia, which joined on 1 January 2009): Belgium, 
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, 
Greece, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. 
 
2. For our research the currency in which the payment is made is all that matters. We do not monitor what 
currency is stated in the invoice or what currency is stated in the contract. 
 
3. FX risk = the risk of loss due to a change in the FX rate of the foreign currency in which a contract is settled. 
 
4. Natural hedging = the balancing of foreign currency payments so that, for example, EUR gained from exports 
are used for purchasing production inputs in EUR without exchanging foreign currencies. Assets in foreign 
currency are covered by liabilities in the same currency. 
 
5. Operational hedging involves, for example, the moving of a company’s production to the customer’s country. 
The exporter thus receives local currency for its goods and also has the majority of its cost (wages, materials, 
etc.) in local currency. 
 
6. An outright forward is a financial derivative involving a modified spot operation that is settled at some point 
in the future, unlike in the case of spot transactions. It is an agreement, made today, to buy something in the 
future for a fixed price. 
 
7. An FX swap involves the actual exchange of two currencies (the principal amount only) on a specific date at a 
rate agreed at the time of the conclusion of the contract, and a reverse exchange of the same two currencies at a 
date further in the future and at a rate agreed at the time of the contract. 
 
8. Consensus Forecast is regular publication issued by Consensus Economics, a company specializing in 
macroeconomic forecasts. 
 
9. Some media organizations publish surveys of economists’ FX rate forecasts or forecasts made by national or 
supranational institutions. 
 
10. Consistently means gradually, with deals being made without consideration of actual or expected FX rate 
developments.                          






Table B-1: Summary Statistics 
     
     
Number of 
observations 
Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min Max 
2005–2008 181  0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00  Hedging on financial markets dummy 
2009  181  0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
2005–2008 181 12.39  1.80  5.26  19.11  Sales (in logarithm) 
2009 176  12.27  1.88  5.27  19.05 
2005–2008 179  0.77 0.21 0.00 1.09  Exports/Sales 
2009  173  0.76 0.23 0.00 1.00 
2005–2008 145  14.01 49.29  0.00 475.83  Exports/Imports 
2009  146  18.93 68.81  0.09 644.58 
Percentage of foreign capital    111  93.95  15.65  29.00  100.00 
Group sales ratio     119  0.40  0.43  0.00  1.00 
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